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THE STATE CONSTITUTIONS AND
THE SUPPLEMENTAL PROTECTION OF
INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS
Robert A. Sedler*

The level of protection of individual rights afforded by state constitutions has been the subject of much academic andjudicial debate.In
this article,ProfessorSedler compares the state constitution to the federal Constitutionand suggests that the function of the state constitution is
to supplement federal protection. He concludes that state constitutions
have the potential to fill the gap in the protection of individual rights.

I.

INTRODUCTION

T

HE state constitution is currently attracting a great deal of
interest as a source of constitutional protection of individual
rights.1 It has been said that state constitutions have been "rediscovered," 2 and there has been much academic 3 and judicial
discussion 4 about reliance on the state constitution instead of the
*Professor of Law, Wayne State University. A.B., 1956, J.D., 1959, University of
Pittsburgh. Valuable assistance in the preparation of this article was provided by
Kevin Kohl, a third year law student at Wayne State University.
1. The term, "individual rights," may be broadly defined to refer to any individual interest that is hindered by governmental action. In this article, however,
the term refers to rights that are arguably within the scope of constitutional provisions that, by their terms, are designed to protect individual rights against governmental action.

2. See Brennan, State Constitutions and the Protectionof Individual Rights, 90
L. REV. 489 (1977); Linde, First Things First:Rediscovering the States' Bill of

HARV.

Rights, 9 U.

BALT.

L. REV. 379 (1980); Kelman, Rediscoveringthe State Constitutional

Bill of Rights, 27 WAYNE L. REV. 413 (1981); Williams, State ConstitutionalLaw
Processes, 24 WM. & MARY L. REV. 169 (1983).
3. In addition to the works cited in note 2, supra, see Collins, Reliance on State

Constitutions-Awayfrom a ReactionaryApproach, 9 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 1 (1981);
Howard, State Courts and ConstitutionalRights in the Day of the Burger Court, 62
VA. L. REV. 873 (1976); Linde, E Pluribus-ConstitutionalTheory and State Courts,
18 GA. L. REV. 165 (1984).
4. Some of the judicial discussion takes the form of law review articles and
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federal Constitution as the basis for challenging state laws or governmental action interfering with individual rights. This reawakened interest in the state constitution may be a reaction to the perceived "pullback" by the United States Supreme Court in extending
constitutional protection to individual rights.5 The purpose of this
article is to put the matter of the state constitution as a source of
constitutional protection of individual rights in perspective and to
consider the function of the state constitution in relation to the
Federal Constitutionas a source of protection of individual rights in
the United States today. It is submitted that the federal Constitution will continue to be the primary source of constitutional protection of individual rights in the United States. Moreover, the federal
courts will continue to be the primary forum in which claims of
constitutional violation of individual rights by state governmental
action will be asserted. The function of the state constitution and of
the state courts will be to supplement the protection of individual
rights afforded by the federal Constitution, and to provide additional protection against state governmental action beyond that which
the United States Supreme Court has found to inhere in the federal
Constitution.
II.

THE FUNCTION OF THE STATE CONSTITUTION IN RELATION TO

THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION AS A SOURCE OF CONSTITUTIONAL
PROTECTION OF INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS

It cannot be disputed that the federal Constitution has long been
relied on as the primary source of constitutional protection of inspeeches. In addition to the writings of Justice Linde, supra notes 2 & 3, see Daughtrey, State Court Activism and Other Symptoms of the New Federalism,45 TENN. L.
REV. 731 (1978); Douglas, State JudicialActivism-The New Role for State Bills of
Rights, 12 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 1123 (1978); Newman, The "Old Federalism":Protection of IndividualRights by State Constitutions in an Era of Federal Court Passivity,
15 CONN. L. REV. 21 (1982); Pollock, State Constitutions as Separate Sources of Fun-

damental Rights, 35 RUTGERS L. REV. 707 (1983). Other times, it finds its way into
judicial opinions. See the discussion by Justice Pollock, writing for the New Jersey
Supreme Court, in Right to Choose v. Byrne, 91 N.J. 287, 299-301, 450 A.2d 925,
931-32 (1982) and the discussion by Justice Tobriner, writing for the California
Supreme Court, in Committee to Defend Reproductive Rights v. Myers, 29 Cal. 3d
252, 262-63, 625 P.2d 779, 783-84, 172 Cal. Rptr. 866, 870-71 (1981).
5. See Brennan, supra note 2, at 495-501; Howard, supra note 3, at 874-79;
Newman, supra note 4, at 21-23. As to the nature and extent of the perceived
"pullback" by the United States Supreme Court, see generally THE BURGER COURT:
THE COUNTER-REVOLUTION THAT WASN'T (V. Blasi, ed. 1983).

Winter 1985]

INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS

dividual rights from state governmental action.' While the state
courts had earlier afforded some protection to individual rights
under state constitutions, the promulgation of the fourteenth
amendment, 7 with its broadly-phrased and open-ended provisions, 8
established the federal Constitution as a potential source of sweeping limitations on the exercise of state governmental power designed to protect individual rights. 9 Fourteenth amendment challenges could be asserted in any case arising in the state courts, and a
state court decision upholding state governmental action against a
fourteenth amendment challenge was reviewable in the United
States Supreme Court. 10 More significantly perhaps, the federal
courts, rather than the state courts, became the primary forum in
which claims of unconstitutional violation of individual rights by
state governmental action were asserted. This resulted from the
enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1871,11 which represented a
"vast transformation of concepts of federalism," and which "interpose[d] the federal courts between the States and the people, as
guardians of the people's federal rights, protect[ing] the people from

6. The overwhelming number of constitutional protection of individual rights
cases decided by the United States Supreme Court, of course, involve challenges to
state or local governmental actions.
7. See generally the discussion in E. Corwin, LIBERTY AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT

89-115 (1948). For an illustrative case, see Wynehamer v. People, 13 N.Y. 378 (1856)
(state prohibition law, as applied to the sale of liquor owned at the time of the
enactment of the law, is violative of the due process clause of state constitution).
8. See the discussion of the "majestic generalities" of the fourteenth amendment
in Sedler, The Legitimacy Debate in ConstitutionalLaw: An Assessment and a Different Perspective, 44 OHIO ST. L.J. 93, 126-32 (1983).
9. Prior to the promulgation of the fourteenth amendment, there were relatively
few cases where state governmental action interfering with individual rights was
found to violate the federal Constitution. Discrimination against residents of sister
states could be challenged under the privileges and immunities clause of article I,
section 4. Certain interferences with contractual rights could be challenged under the
"impairment provision" of article I,section 10. State economic regulation or taxation
affecting interstate commerce could be challenged under the negative aspect of the
commerce clause. But in the aggregate, challenges to state governmental action
under the federal Constitution were relatively few.
10. Some of the early "landmark" fourteenth amendment cases came to the
United States Supreme Court on review from the highest state court. See, e.g.,
Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1880); The Slaughterhouse Cases, 83 U.S.
(16 Wall.) 36 (1873).
11. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982).
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unconstitutional action under color of state law."12 In practice,
lawyers seeking to assert constitutional challenges to state governmental action would try, whenever possible, to bring their cases
in the federal courts. 13 In the United States then, constitutional
protection of individual rights against state governmental action
has come to depend primarily on the federal Constitution and the
federal courts.
At the same time, the state constitution and the state courts have
always been available as an additional source of constitutional protection of individual rights. Questions of state constitutional law, as
well as federal constitutional law, could be and were presented in
cases originating in the state courts, such as criminal prosecutions
and civil litigation between private persons. For example, prior to
the "constitutionalization" of criminal procedure by the United
States Supreme Court in the 1960's, some state courts had interpreted the state constitution as affording greater protection to
criminal defendants than was required by the federal Constitution. 14 State courts could also invoke specific state constitutional
provisions, having no analogue in the federal Constitution, to invalidate state governmental action.1 5 State courts were also free to
interpret broadly-phrased and open-ended provisions of the state
constitution, such as the due process1 6 and equal protection clauses,
as affording greater protection to individual rights than was
afforded by the Supreme Court's interpretation of the analogous
federal provisions. Some state courts continued to rely on the due

12. Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 242 (1972).
13. Affirmative suits challenging state governmental action in the federal courts
were made possible by the United States Supreme Court's holding in Ex Parte
Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908), to the effect that although the action of a state officer
was a "state action" for fourteenth amendment purposes, a suit against a state officer
was not a suit against the "state" for eleventh amendment purposes. For a comprehensive historical analysis of affirmative suits challenging state governmental
action in the federal courts, see Wechsler, Federal Courts, State Criminal Law and
the First Amendment, 49 N.Y.U. L. REV. 740 (1974).

14. For example, prior to Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), a number of state
courts had adopted the exclusionary rule as a matter of state law. See People v.
Cahan, 44 Cal. 2d 434, 282 P.2d 905 (1955), and the listing of cases in the appendix to
Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 33-38 (1949).
15. Such a provision is an "open courts" provision, invoked to strike down a state
guest statute. See Ludwig v. Johnson, 243 Ky. 533, 49 S.W.2d 347 (1932).
16. Sometimes the state constitutional guarantee is expressed in terms of "law of
the land" rather than "due process of law."
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process and equal protection clauses of the state constitution to invalidate governmental economic regulation 1 7 after the United
States Supreme Court had taken a "judicial abstention" approach to
economic regulation challenges.1 "
The point to be emphasized is that at the time the state constitutions were "rediscovered," they were not in a condition of quiescence. The state constitution had always been available as a source
of constitutional protection of individual rights against state governmental action. In practice, the function of the state constitution
had been to provide additionalprotection to individual rights, beyond that which was provided by the federal Constitution.
The respective functions of the federal and state constitutions as
the basis of constitutional protection of individual rights in the
United States will not change notwithstanding the "rediscovery" of
the state constitution. This is so for two reasons. First, there is a
finite quantum of protection to individual rights that can be extended under any constitution. The federal Constitution has already
been interpreted as extending a substantial amount of constitutional protection to individual rights. Limitations on the exercise of governmental power designed to protect individual rights
19
must be found in the text or internal inferences of a constitution,
and there are outer limits of permissible constitutional interpretation. Further constraints on the scope of constitutional protection of
20
individual rights inhere in the nature of the judicial process.
Courts do not want to interpret the constitution in such a way that it
will diminish public acceptance of the constitution as a limitation on
governmental power and the court's role in defining the con-

17. See the discussion infra notes 49-52 and accompanying text.
18. See the discussion of "judicial abstention" in McCloskey, Economic Due Process and the Supreme Court: An Exhumation and Reburial, 1962 SuP. CT. REV. 34.

When these [due process] cases were taken together with a companion series in
which the equal protection clause was given a similarly permissive scope, there
could be little doubt as to the practical result: no claim of substantive economic
rights would now be sustained by the Supreme Court. The judiciary had abdicated the field.
Id. at 38.
19. As has been observed: "A decision limiting governmental power must be
grounded in a limitation on governmental power contained in the Constitution."
Sandalow, ConstitutionalInterpretation,79 MICH. L. REV. 1033, 1050 (1981).
20. See the discussion in Sedler, supra note 8, at 118-19.
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stitution. 21 Therefore, even if state courts were disposed to interpret
state constitutions as broadly as possible, they would only be able to
extend some additional degree of protection to individual rights beyond that provided by the federal Constitution. Thus, as a matter of
substantive constitutional protection, it is impossible for the state
constitution to supplant the federal Constitution as the primary
source of constitutional protection of individual rights.
Second, the capacity of the state constitution to protect individual
rights depends on the extent to which parties will choose to base
their constitutional claims on the state constitution rather than the
federal Constitution. While claims under the federal Constitution
may be asserted in either the federal or state courts, claims under
the state constitution may be asserted only in state courts. 2 2 Experience indicates that when given a choice, 23 parties invariably will try
to present their constitutional challenge in the federal courts. 24 The
reasons for the preference for the federal forum are obvious. Apart
from the perceived greater competency of federal judges over state

21. Id. at 119-20.
22. The eleventh amendment precludes the federal courts from granting relief
against state officials on the basis of state law. Pennhurst State School & Hospital v.
Halderman, 104 S. Ct. 900 (1984). Therefore, a party seeking to assert a claim under
both the federal Constitution and the state constitution would have to bring the suit
in the state court.
23. The Younger doctrine ordinarily precludes utilization of the federal courts to
assert a constitutional claim where the federal plaintiff is a party to a pending state
criminal or civil proceeding. See generally Sedler, Younger and Its Progeny: A Variation on the Theme of Equity, Comity and Federalism, 9 U. TOL. L. REV. 681 (1978).
24. Thus, a party seeking to engage in a course of conduct prohibited by state law
is likely to try to obtain an advance determination as to the law's constitutionality in
the federal court rather than in the state court. See, e.g., Steffel v. Thompson, 415
U.S. 452 (1974). The federal court must respect the plaintiffs choice of a federal
forum, notwithstanding that the challenge is to the constitutionality of state governmental action. "[C]ongress imposed the duty upon all levels of the federal judiciary to give due respect to a suitor's choice of a federal forum for the hearing and
decision of his federal constitutional claims." Zwickler v. Koota, 389 U.S. 241, 248
(1967). Moreover, the federal courts may not invoke abstention on the ground that
the challenged state action could be unconstitutional under an analogous provision of
the state constitution. Examining Bd. v. Flores de Otero, 426 U.S. 572 (1976); Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433 (1971). Abstention is proper only where the
challenged action could be unconstitutional under a provision of the state constitution specific to the state, such as one relating to the internal governance of the state.
See Harris County Comm'rs Court v. Moore, 420 U.S. 77 (1975) (redistricting of
justice of the peace districts might be violative of state constitutional provisions
relating to the election of minor judiciary).
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judges generally, constitutional challenges often will be controversial, and it is more prudent to bring such a challenge in the
politically-insulated federal forum. Because federal judges are not
popularly elected, they are not subject to the same kind of "public
pressure" as are their state court counterparts. 25 Thus, a lawyer
contemplating a constitutional challenge to state-imposed school
segregation or to a state anti-abortion law, for example, or any other
politically-charged matter, would be highly likely to choose a federal forum, because the chance of success is greater. Perhaps the most
important aspect of the choice between a federal and a state forum
relates to the matter of the "court of last resort." Since the United
States Supreme Court can review only a limited number of cases,
the realistic question for the lawyer initiating a constitutional challenge is whether it is better to have the "court of last resort" be a
state appellate court or a federal court of appeals. Unless the highest appellate court of a particular state has shown itself especially
disposed to extend constitutional protection to individual rights,26
the lawyer will doubtless choose to bring the case in the politically
insulated federal forum so that the "court of last resort" will be a
federal court of appeals rather than a state appellate court.
The decision to choose the federal forum ordinarily will not be
affected by the fact that the lawyer will be giving up any claim
under the state constitution. Suppose that a lawyer is faced with a
case of first impression, for example, a challenge to a law which
prohibits a teacher from "advocating, soliciting, imposing, en-

25. As the author observed some years ago:
The federal judge is a part of the local community and is subject to what could be
called the 'cocktail party syndrome.' He is a member of the local 'establishment'
and his social and personal relationships revolve around the same class of persons as do those of state court judges and state officials. He is subject to the
charge of 'betrayal' if he upholds federal constitutional rights so as to lend support to an 'unpopular cause.' However, while he may be subject to social pressure,
he is not subject to political pressure in the sense that unlike practically all lower
court judges and many appellate state judges, he does not have to run for reelection. Moreover, he is not only more expert in the relevant constitutional
doctrines, but has still another public to face, that of his brethren on the federal
bench.
Sedler, The Dombrowski-Type Suit as an Effective Weapon for Social Change: Reflections from Without and Within, 18 KAN. L. REV. 237, 254 (1970).

26. The California Supreme Court has been, for example, a court inclined to
provide extensive constitutional protection to individuals.
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couraging or promoting public or private homosexual activity."2 7 If
the lawyer brings the challenge in the state court, the lawyer has
potential state constitutional claims, such as that the law is violative of a specific state constitutional provision,' s or the free speech
provision of the state constitution, as well as a first amendment
claim. If the suit is brought in the federal court, there is only the
first amendment claim. Yet, it would be expected that the lawyer
would bring the suit in federal court, because the constitutional
claim is more likely to be sustained in the politically-insulated
federal forum. If the federal judge invalidates the law, the judge
may be denounced in the local press as being "soft on homosexuality," but unlike the state court judge, that charge cannot be used by
an opponent in the next judicial election. Similarly, since review in
the United States Supreme Court can never be assumed,2 9 and state
appellate court judges are subject to these same influences, the
lawyers would rather have the "court of last resort" be the federal
court of appeals rather than the state appellate court. Federal courts
are perceived as the more effective vehicle for protection of individual rights which causes lawyers asserting constitutional
claims to utilize federal courts in preference to the state courts
whenever possible.3 ° And lawyers will ordinarily do so even at the
price of abandoning possible claims under the state constitution.
The preferred utilization of federal courts to assert constitutional
claims further reduces the capacity of the state constitution to serve
as a source for protection of individual rights.
The capacity of the state constitution to serve as a source for
the constitutional protection of individual rights in comparison to
the federal Constitution is necessarily limited. It is limited first by
the fact that there is a finite quantum of constitutional protection
afforded to individual rights and the federal Constitution has
already been interpreted as extending a substantial amount of constitutional protection to individual rights. 31 This protective capacity
27. See Oklahoma City Bd. of Educ. v. Nat'l Gay Task Force, 729 F.2d 1270 (10th
Cir. 1984), affd. by divided court, 53 U.S.L.W. 4408 (March 26, 1985).
28. Such a provision is one relating to the internal governance of the state. Cf.
Harris County Comm'rs Court, 420 U.S. at 77.
29. In the case at issue, review was granted at the instance of the state after the
lower courts had declared the law unconstitutional.
30. See the discussion in Sedler, supra note 24, at 254-55.
31. Suppose, for example, that a state criminal defendant moves to suppress the
introduction of evidence on the ground that it was obtained by an illegal search or
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of the state constitution is also limited by the fact that the federal
court generally will be the preferred forum for the assertion of constitutional claims. As new kinds of constitutional claims arise, it is
far more likely that they will be asserted in the federal courts under
the federal Constitution than in the state courts under the state
constitution.
Thus, the state constitution will continue to supplement the federal Constitution as a source of constitutional protection of individual
rights. This supplemental function is reflected in the cases involving challenges to deprivation of individual rights under the state
constitution that are being brought in the state courts today. An
analysis of such cases reveals that a challenge under the state constitution in the state courts 3 2 generally will be asserted only where
it is clear that such a challenge under the federal Constitution has
proved or is likely to prove to be unavailing. In practice, there are
relatively few "first impression" constitutional challenges in state
courts. Typically, after a particular challenge under the federal
Constitution, such as one to inequality of state financing of public
education, 33 or to the denial of medicaid funding for abortion, 34 has
been rejected by the United States Supreme Court, the same constitutional challenge is made under the state constitution in the
state court. Or, after the United States Supreme Court has made it
clear that the federal Constitution cannot be relied on effectively to
challenge certain kinds of state governmental action, such as economic regulation, 35 or gun control,3 parties will then resort to the

seizure. The state court will invariably consider the fourth amendment question first,
because of its extensive interpretation by the United States Supreme Court. Only if
there has been no fourth amendment violation will the state consider whether the
search or seizure was violative of the analogous state constitutional provision. See,
e.g., People v. Beavers, 393 Mich. 554, 227 N.W.2d 511 (1975).
32. We are generally excluding from our consideration state constitutional claims
involving the rights of criminal defendants. Here, the challenge must initially be
asserted in the state courts, so it may be assumed that state constitutional claims will
be asserted together with federal constitutional claims. For a discussion regarding
the extent to which state courts have interpreted the state constitution as providing
greater protection for criminal defendants than is provided under the federal Constitution, see generally Developments-State Constitutional Law, 95 HARV. L. REV.
1324, 1370-84 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Developments].
33. See infra notes 138-48 and accompanying text.
34. See infra notes 180-87 and accompanying text.
35. See infra notes 43-44 and accompanying text.
36. On the subject of the state constitution and the right to bear arms, see general-
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state constitution to challenge those kinds of state governmental
action. While the number of cases presenting challenges under a
state constitution in state courts is increasing, the cases usually
present challenges that would not be recognized under the federal
Constitution. 3 7 A "first impression" constitutional case in the state
courts is likely to be one that could not be brought initially in the
federal courts, such as one arising in civil litigation between private
parties. 38 As a practical matter, the real issue in most cases involving constitutional challenges under the state constitution is
whether the state court will reach a different result under the state
constitution than the United States Supreme Court has reached
under the federal Constitution. In this sense, it is fair to say that
state constitutional law in practice is "reactive" to federal constitutional law.3 9
To say that the function of the state constitution as a source of
protection of individual rights is to supplement the protection
afforded by the federal Constitution is not to suggest that this function is insignificant. While there is a finite quantum of constitutional protection that may be afforded to individual rights, and
while the federal Constitution has been interpreted as extending a
substantial amount of protection to those rights,4 ° there is still a
gap in the protection that the state constitutions may fill. There are
certain kinds of constitutional challenges, such as challenges to
state economic regulation, or to general classifications involving
non-fundamental rights, where the federal Constitution has been
interpreted as affording little or no protection. There are important
individual rights claims, such as equality of school financing, medicaid funding for abortions, or claims of constitutional protection for
ly Dowlut & Knoop, State Constitutions and the Right to Keep and Bear Arms, 7
OKLA. CITY L. REV. 177 (1982).
37. In practice, the parties will join claims under the federal Constitution, hoping
that the state courts will look on those claims more favorably than the federal courts.
Additionally, it appears that in a number of cases in the economic regulation area,
the state courts sometimes do not separate the federal and state constitutional
claims. To the extent that they do, however, the courts set the case up for possible
review by the United States Supreme Court on the federal constitutional claim. See
Michigan v. Long, 103 S. Ct. 3469 (1983).
38. See infra note 83 and accompanying text.
39. For the argument that state constitutional law should not be "reactive" to
federal constitutional law, see Collins, supra note 3, at 1; Linde, supra note 3, at 165.
40. And to some extent, the federal Constitution may be interpreted as extending
even more protection in the future.
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certain privacy and associational interests, that have been rejected
by the United States Supreme Court under the federal Constitution.
The gap in protection is still substantial, and state courts have the
opportunity to expand considerably the scope of constitutional protection of individual rights in the United States. Because the United
States is a federal system, there is a double source of constitutional
protection. It is the function of the state constitution to supplement
the protection of individual rights and to provide greater protection
for individual rights than is provided by the federal Constitution.
III.

THE STATE CONSTITUTION IN PRACTICE

An exploration of the operation of the state constitution as a
supplemental source of protection of individual rights against state
governmental action illustrates a number of areas where state constitutions have been interpreted as providing greater protection to
individual rights than is provided by the federal Constitution, and
identifies the factors that have led to this greater protection. The
possibility of distortion resulting from the fact that fifty states are
involved must be taken into account. The present article does not
attempt to undertake a state-by-state analysis of the scope of protection afforded by the constitutions of all fifty states. Such an analysis
would probably reveal that in many states, the state constitution
has not been interpreted as providing much or any more protection
to individual rights than is provided under the federal Constitution.
It is suspected that the potential of the state constitution as a source
of constitutional protection of individual rights has not begun to be
realized in many states. 41 At the other end of the spectrum, looking
to what may be called the major areas of state constitutional litigation, some state courts have been very active in utilizing the state
constitution to provide greater protection to individual rights than
is provided by the federal Constitution.4 2 In any event, the purpose
here is not to analyze how protection of individual rights under the
state constitutions has fared in each of the fifty states.
Rather the focus is on major areas of state constitutional litigation to demonstrate the potential of the state constitution as a
supplemental source of constitutional protection. Consideration is
41. Perhaps in part, this is because lawyers have not yet begun to use the state
constitution as a claimed source of protection for individual rights against state
governmental action.
42. The California Supreme Court has taken the lead in this regard.
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limited largely to cases within the last decade. Analysis reveals that
in the aggregate there are a large number of state court decisions
that have interpreted the state constitution as enlarging on the
protection for individual rights provided by the federal Constitution. There are a number of state court decisions that have invalidated state economic and social regulatory laws that almost
assuredly would have been sustained by the United States Supreme
Court against due process and equal protection attacks under the
federal Constitution. There are likewise state court decisions that
have extended constitutional protection to privacy and associational
interests beyond those recognized by the Supreme Court. Finally,
cases where state courts have invalidated systems of public school
financing and bans on medicaid funding for abortion under state
constitutions are considered. What should be clear from this analysis is that although the function of the state constitution is supplemental to that of the federal Constitution, it is indeed significant.
A. State Economic and Social Regulation
State economic and social regulation furnishes the best opportunity for state courts to provide constitutional protection far beyond
that provided by the federal Constitution. The Supreme Court has
taken a "hands-oW' approach to state economic regulation challenged as violative of due process or equal protection,4 3 and has
given only minimal scrutiny to legislative regulations and classifications that do not implicate "fundamental rights. 4 4 Thus, parties
wishing to challenge state economic regulation have no choice but to
bring their challenges in the state courts under the state constitution. A state constitutional claim also may be more effective in
challenging a state regulation or classification that does not implicate "fundamental rights."
The crucial question is whether state courts will interpret the due
43. See supra note 18 and accompanying text. See also New Orleans v. Dukes, 427
U.S. 297 (1976); North Dakota State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Snyder's Drug Stores, 414
U.S. 156 (1973); Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726 (1963).
44. See generally Schweiker v. Wilson, 450 U.S. 221 (1981); United States R.R.
Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166 (1980); New York City Transit Authority v.
Beazer, 440 U.S. 568 (1979); Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, 438
U.S. 598 (1978); Kelley v. Johnson, 425 U.S. 238 (1976). It is only where the regulation or classification is found to be "objectively unreasonable" that the Court will
invalidate it under the "rational basis" standard of review. See, e.g., Logan v.
Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 122 (1982); United States Dep't of Agriculture v.
Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (1973). Cf. Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55 (1982).
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process and equal protection clauses of the state constitution as
authorizing substantialscrutiny of state economic and social regulation. The substantial scrutiny that some state courts give to state
economic and social regulation is sometimes articulated in terms of
a "fair and substantial relationship" standard of review,4 5 and
sometimes only in terms of a "rational basis" standard of review. 46
Regardless of the standard applied, these courts will carefully
scrutinize the ends-means fit and may even consider the availability
of "less drastic means" to advance the legislative purpose. 4 7 Moreover, the state court may go so far as to say that the asserted
governmental interest is not of sufficient importance to justify interference with economic freedom.48
In other words, some state courts have not followed the United
States Supreme Court in taking a "hands-off' approach to state
economic regulation challenged as violative of due process and
equal protection. Rather, as one commentator has observed: "many
[state] courts defer to legislative judgments in terms similar to those
used by the United States Supreme Court ....A number of state
courts, however, prefer a more searching inquiry into the justification for state regulation of economic activity. '49 Occasionally the
state court will be quite explicit in its rejection of the Supreme
Court's hands-off approach. As the Maryland Court of Appeals has
stated: "Therefore, it is readily apparent that whatever may be the
current direction taken by the Supreme Court in the area of economic regulation, as distinguished from the protection of fundamental rights, Maryland and Pennsylvania adhere to the more
traditional test formulated by the Supreme Court."5 ° But more fre45. See City of Russellville v. Vulcan Materials Co., 382 So. 2d 525 (Ala. 1980);
Maryland Bd. of Pharmacy v. Save-a-Lot, Inc., 270 Md. 103, 311 A.2d 242 (1973).
46. See Horsemen's Benevolent & Protective Ass'n v. Div. of Pari-Mutual Wagering, 397 So. 2d 692 (Fla. 1981); In re Ashton Park Hosp., 282 N.C. 542, 193 S.E.2d 729
(1973).
47. See City of Russellville v. Vulcan Materials Co., 382 So. 2d 525 (Ala. 1980);
City and County of Denver v. Nielson, 194 Colo. 407, 572 P.2d 484 (1977).
48. See In re Ashton Park Hosp., 282 N.C. 542, 193 S.E.2d 729 (1973). See also
infra notes 54-57 and accompanying text.
49. Howard, supra note 3, at 882-83.
50. Maryland Bd. of Pharmacy v. Save-a-Lot, Inc., 270 Md. 103,120,311 A.2d 242,
251 (1973). Here, the Maryland Court of Appeals invalidated on substantive due
process grounds a state law prohibiting drug price advertising. Accord Pennsylvania
State Bd. of Pharmacy vPastor, 441 Pa. 186,272 A.2d 487 (1971). The United States
Supreme Court, in contrast, has held that price advertising comes within the protec-
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quently, state courts do not expressly indicate that they are applying a standard of review different from that employed by the United
States Supreme Court. 51 However, it is clear that these courts are
giving substantial scrutiny to the challenged economic regulation,
and that this has resulted in the invalidation of state regulatory
laws that almost assuredly would have been sustained by the
United States Supreme Court against due process
and equal protec52
tion challenges under the federal Constitution.
Typical of such a situation is the decision of the North Carolina
Supreme Court in In re Ashton Park Hospital,53 where the court
invalidated, under the state constitution, a law requiring state
approval for the construction of a private hospital. The purpose of
the law was to ensure that the development of health and medical
care facilities in the state would be "accomplished in a manner
which [was] orderly, timely, economical, and without unnecessary
duplication of these facilities."5 4 The court held that the asserted
governmental interest in preventing duplication of health care
facilities was insufficient to justify the interference with property
interests that were protected by the "law of the land" clause of the
state constitution. 5 5 It stated as follows:
tion of the first amendment as a form of "commercial speech." Virginia State Bd. of
Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
51. Sometimes the state courts rely on the due process and equal protection
clauses of the federal and state constitutions indiscriminately. This phenomenon
appears in a number of the cases. Ordinarily there will not be any indication whether
the state court relied on both the due process and equal protection clauses of the
federal and state constitutions or only on the state constitutional provision. When the
state courts rely on the federal and state constitutional provisions indiscriminately
and invalidate the challenged action, they usually are reaching a different result
than would have been reached had the challenge been asserted before the federal
courts. Thus, any reliance on the federal Constitution turns out to be unimportant. In
practice, the invalidation of the challenged state governmental action results from
the fact that the challenge was brought in the state court rather than in the federal
court.
52. See the discussion of the "techniques" employed by the state courts in these
cases in Howard, supra note 3, at 886-91.
53. 282 N.C. 542, 193 S.E.2d 729 (1973).
54. Id. at 544, 193 S.E.2d at 731.
55. The "law of the land" provision of the state constitution reads as follows: "No
person shall be taken, imprisoned, or disseized of his freehold, liberties, or privileges,
or outlawed, or exiled, or in any manner deprived of his life, liberty, or property, but
by the law of the land." N.C. CONST. art. I, § 19. The "law of the land" language traces
back to the Magna Charta, while the "due process" language traces back to the
Statute of 28 Edward III (1355). See E. Corwin, supra note 7, at 90-91.
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Compulsory curtailment of facilities for the care of the sick is not a
reasonable choice of a remedy for a shortage of trained hospital personnel, nurses, and doctors. In any event, we hold that Article I, § 19 of
the Constitution of this State does not permit the Legislature to authorize a State board or commission to forbid persons, with the use of their
own property and funds, to construct adequate facilities and to employ
therein a licensed professional and quasi-professional staff for the
treatment of sick people, who desire the service, merely because to do so
endangers the ability of other, established hospitals to keep all their
beds occupied. 56
The court also gave a reading to the "law of the land" clause
reminiscent of the United States Supreme Court's reading of the due
process clause in the Lochner era:
Any exercise by the State of its police power is, of course, a deprivation
of liberty. Whether it is a violation of the Law of the Land Clause or a
valid exercise of the police power is a question of degree and of
reasonableness in relation to the public good likely to result from it. To
deny a person, association or corporation the right to engage in a business, otherwise lawful, is a far greater restriction upon his or its liberty
than to deny the right to charge in that business whatever prices the
owner sees fit to charge for service. Consequently, such a deprivation of
his liberty requires a substantially greater likelihood of benefit to the
based upon Article I,
public in order to enable it to survive his attack
57
§ 19 of the Constitution of North Carolina.
The court then concluded that there was no "reasonable relation
between the denial of the right of a person, association or corporation to construct and operate upon his or its own property, with his
or its own funds, an adequately staffed and equipped hospital and
5
the promotion of the public health., ' For good measure, the court
also found the law violative of the "anti-monopoly" and "exclusive
59
privileges" provisions of the state constitution. The following year
the same court invalidated the state fair trade law as a delegation of

56. 282 N.C. at 549, 193 S.E.2d at 734.
57. Id. at 550, 193 S.E.2d at 735.
58. Id. at 551, 193 S.E.2d at 735.
59. Id. These state-specific provisions read as follows: "No person or set of persons
is entitled to exclusive or separate emoluments or privileges from the community but
in consideration of public services." N.C. CONST. art. I, § 32. "Perpetuities and
monopolies are contrary to the genius of a free state and shall not be allowed." N.C.
CONST. art. I, § 34.
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legislative power to a private corporation and as a deprivation of the
60
liberty of non-signers under the "law of the land clause."
The same "judicial activism" with respect to state economic regulation is found in a number of other state court decisions. The Florida Supreme Court invalidated a state law requiring the payment of
a portion of horseracing purses to a horsemen's association on the
ground that the law did not bear a reasonable relationship to the
stated purpose of encouraging the continuous stabling of thoroughbred horses in Florida. This was because the law contained no provision as to how the funds paid to the horsemen's association would be
spent in furtherance of that objective. 61 The Alabama Supreme
Court invalidated a municipal law regulating the detonation of explosives, which had the effect of prohibiting the operation of a stone
quarry in the city, on the ground that "less restrictive standards
would produce the same degree of safety without having the effect of
prohibiting the operation of the quarry."6 2 The Kentucky Supreme
Court invalidated a municipal ordinance prohibiting coal tipples on
the same ground.63 Additionally, the Nebraska Supreme Court invalidated a milk price-fixing scheme as violative of the due process
clause of the state constitution on the ground that it discriminated
against efficient producers in favor of inefficient producers and
would tend to foster anti-competitive practices in the industry, contrary to the law's stated purposes. 64 Other state economic regula60. Bulova Watch Co. v. Brand Distributors, 285 N.C. 467, 206 S.E.2d 141 (1974).
For a discussion of other state court decisions invalidating fair trade laws, see Kirby,
Expansive Judicial Review of Economic Regulation Under State Constitutions: The

Case for Realism, 48 TENN. L. REV. 241, 252-53 (1981).
61. Horsemen's Benevolent & Protective Ass'n v. Div. of Pari-Mutual Wagering,
397 So. 2d 692 (Fla. 1981). The court stated that the law was an unlawful exercise of
the police power, because there was not a reasonable relationship between the objective of the law and the means utilized to achieve the objective. It did not cite the
applicable constitutional provision, but presumably was relying on the due process
clause.
62. City of Russellville v. Vulcan Materials Co., 382 So. 2d 525 (Ala. 1980). Again,
the court did not cite the applicable constitutional provision, but presumably was
relying on the due process clause. In Estell v. City of Birmingham, 291 Ala. 680, 286
So. 2d 872 (1973), the same court invalidated a law prohibiting the "scalping" of
football tickets.
63. U.S. Mining & Exploration Natural Resources Co. v. City of Beattyville, 548
S.W.2d 833 (Ky. 1977). Here too the court did not cite the applicable constitutional
provision, but again presumably was relying on the due process clause.
64. Gillette Dairy, Inc. v. Nebraska Dairy Products Bd., 192 Neb. 89, 219 N.W.2d
214 (1974). The court concluded: "[w]e find the minimum basic costs provisions of the
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tions that have been invalidated under the due process clauses of
state constitutions in fairly recent years include: a Nevada law prohibiting the delivery of gasoline from trucks having capacity in
excess of 2,000 gallons; 6 5 an Alabama law requiring employers to
pay the salaries up to twenty-one days for employees on temporary
active duty with the National Guard of a reserve unit;66 a city ordinance in Louisiana that prohibited "froggigging" on a particular
lake for most of the year. 67 Massage regulation laws, such as those
prohibiting the administration of a massage to members of the opposite sex, have also been held by some 68courts to be violative of the
state constitution's due process clause.
A number of state courts have also invalidated particular state
economic regulations on equal protection grounds. Here again,
there has been substantial scrutiny of the reasonableness of the
classification, in a manner decidedly different from the way that
the United States Supreme Court scrutinizes classifications under
the rational basis standard of review. Sunday closing laws were
invalidated in Alabama insofar as they exempted food stores with

questioned act to be arbitrary, discriminatory, and demonstrably irrelevant to the
policy the Legislature is free to adopt, and hence an unnecessary and unwarranted
interference with individual liberty." Id. at 102, 219 N.W.2d at 222. See also the
discussion in Lincoln Dairy Co. v. Finigan, 170 Neb. 777, 786, 104 N.W.2d 227, 233
(1960), where the court emphasized the importance of property rights under the
Nebraska Constitution, and noted that: "[tihe court has also consistently held that
the regulation of legitimate business may not be so unreasonable as to result in the
confiscation of property and the rights incidental to its ownership." In Finigan,the
court invalidated a regulation prohibiting the sale of milk that did not meet "Grade
A" requirements. See also United States Brewers Ass'n v. State, 192 Neb. 328, 220
N.W.2d 544 (1974) (invalidating a law giving the state liquor commission wide discretion in regulating the allocation of beer and liquor distributorships); Skag-Way
Dept. Stores v. City of Omaha, 179 Neb. 707, 140 N.W.2d 28 (1966) (invalidating a
municipal Sunday closing ordinance).
65. In re Martin, 88 Nev. 666, 504 P.2d 14 (1972).
66. White Associated Indus. of Alabama, 373 So. 2d 616 (Ala. 1979). Cf.Day-Brite
Lighting Inc. v. Missouri, 342 U.S. 421 (1952) (no violation of fourteenth amendment's due process clause by state law requiring employer to give employees four
hours off with pay in order to vote).
67. City of Shreveport v. Curry, 357 So. 2d 1078 (La. 1978).
68. City & County of Denver v. Nielson, 194 Colo. 407, 572 P.2d 484 (1977);
Myrick v. Board of Pierce County Comm'rs, 101 Wash. 2d 140, 677 P.2d 140 (1984).
Most state courts, however, have upheld such massage regulation laws. See, e.g., City
of Indianapolis v. Wright, 267 Ind. 471, 371 N.E.2d 1298 (1978); Massage Parlors,
Inc. v. Mayor of Baltimore, 284 Md. 490, 398 A.2d 52 (1979).
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four or less employees, 69 and in Pennsylvania insofar as they exrendered Sun-2
empted family-run grocery stores.7 ° Exceptions 7also
1
day closing laws unconstitutional in Colorado and Nebraska.
Hair-cutting regulations discriminating between barbers and cosmetologists have been invalidated in Minnesota, v3 Michigan 74 and
Maryland.7 5 The Michigan Supreme Court invalidated, on equal
protection grounds, a refuse collection ordinance that distinguished
between apartment buildings with four or less units and other
apartment buildings with respect to charges for refuse collection.7 6
The Maine Supreme Court took similar action with respect to a law
that exacted higher license fees for junkyards within 100 feet of
highways.7 7
The equal protection clause of the state constitution has also been
relied on to invalidate state licensing laws. The California Supreme
Court invalidated on equal protection grounds a state law that prohibited the licensing of graduates of out-of-state colleges of
osteopathy.78 The Alaska Supreme Court used the equal protection
clause of the state constitution to invalidate a legislative attempt to
limit the number of commercial fishers in its waters. Under the law,
permits were required for commercial fishing after January 1, 1974,
69. Piggly-Wiggly of Jacksonville, Inc. v. City of Jacksonville, 336 So. 2d 1078
(Ala. 1976).
70. Goodman v. Kennedy, 459 Pa. 313, 329 A.2d 224 (1974). The court upheld the
law's provisions exempting stores with less than 10 employees.
71. Dunbar v. Hoffman, 171 Colo. 481, 468 P.2d 742 (1970).
72. Skag-Way Dept. Stores v. City of Omaha, 179 Neb. 707,140 N.W.2d 28 (1966).
73. Grassman v. Minnesota Bd. of Barber Examiners, 304 N.W.2d 909 (Minn.
1981). The Minnesota regulations applied to barbers, but not to cosmetologists.
74. People v. McDonald, 67 Mich. App. 64, 240 N.W.2d 268 (1976). The Michigan
regulations prohibited cosmetologists from cutting men's hair, but permitted barbers
to cut both men's and women's hair.
75. Maryland State Bd. of Barber Examiners v. Kuhn, 270 Md. 496,312 A.2d 216
(1973). The Maryland regulations likewise prohibited cosmetologists from cutting
men's hair.
76. Alexander v. City of Detroit, 392 Mich. 30, 219 N.W.2d 41 (1974).
77. Ace Tire Co. v. Municipal Officers, 302 A.2d 90 (Me. 1973).
78. D'Amico v. Board of Medical Examiners, 11 Cal. 3d 1, 520 P.2d 10, 112 Cal.
Rptr. 786 (1974). The court based its decisions on both the federal and state equal
protection clauses. The discrimination on the basis of whether the college of
osteopathy was in-state or out-state might be so "objectively unreasonable" that the
United States Supreme Court would find it to be violative of the federal equal protection clause. See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
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and no permits were to be issued to those fishers who did not hold a
"gear license" issued prior to January 1, 1973. The classification on
the basis of the date of receiving "gear licenses" was found to bear
"no fair and substantial relationship" to the purpose of the law. 79
Finally, some state courts have given greater scrutiny to classifications contained in social welfare legislation than the United
States Supreme Court has been willing to give to such classifications challenged as violative of the fourteenth amendment's equal
protection clause. For example, the Michigan Supreme Court has
held that a provision of the state worker's compensation law which
subtracted weekly worker's compensation benefits from unemployment compensation benefits denied equal protection. 0 And both the
Michigan Supreme Court81 and the North Dakota Supreme Court, 2
have held that the exclusion of agricultural workers from worker's
compensation coverage denied equal protection.
Apart from general economic and social regulation, state courts
have been very active in recent years dealing with challenges under
the state constitution to laws regulating the rights of parties in civil
litigation. In this situation, the capacity of the state constitution to
serve as the source of constitutional protection of individual rights
is enhanced by the fact that these questions will arise in the state
courts in the first instance. They will be asserted in the context of
civil litigation between private persons in the state courts, when one
party seeks to avoid an unfavorable state law by challenging its
constitutionality.8 3 While the challenge may be asserted under both
the federal and state constitutions, the state court is likely to pass
on the state constitutional question first. In any event, the federal

79. Isakson v. Rickey, 550 P.2d 359 (Alaska 1976).
80. Fox v. Employment Sec. Comm'n, 379 Mich. 579, 153 N.W.2d 644 (1967).
81. Gallegos v. Glaser Crandall Co., 388 Mich. 654, 202 N.W.2d 786 (1972).
82. Benson v. North Dakota Workmen's Compensation Bureau, 283 N.W.2d 96
(N.D. 1979).
83. In rare cases, the challenge may be asserted in the federal courts, such as
where federal jurisdiction is based on diversity of citizenship. Thus in Moran v.
Beyer, 734 F.2d 1245 (7th Cir. 1984), the Seventh Circuit, applying the rational
relationship test, invalidated the Illinois spousal immunity rule as applied to bar an
action for an intentional tort committed by a spouse during the marriage. At the time
of the suit, the couple were divorced and living in different states. Thus, the suit could
be brought in the federal court on the basis of diversity of citizenship, but as the court
noted, "[m]ost cases of this sort would, of course, be resolved in state court." 734 F.2d
at 1245 n.2.
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constitutional challenge may sometimes be foreclosed by prior
United States Supreme Court decisions.
Guest statutes also may serve as the focal point of analysis. While
the United States Supreme Court has summarily upheld the constitutionality of state guest statutes against equal protection
challenges, 4 a number of state courts, applying substantial scrutiny, have found that the required showing of a higher standard of
care in suits by guest passengers does not bear a "fair and substantial relation" to the asserted justifications of encouraging
hospitality and preventing collusive suits against insurers. In some
cases, the courts have expressly invoked the "fair and substantial
relation" test,8 5 but in all of the cases where the laws have been
invalidated, the courts have found the asserted justifications wanting. Again, the result depends on whether the courts are willing to
interpret the equal protection clause of the state constitution as
requiring a higher degree of justification for the discriminatory
treatment of guest passengers than is required under the equal protection clause of the federal Constitution.8 6 Using the same approach, the Minnesota Supreme Court held that a provision of the
survival statute providing that intentional torts do not survive the
violative of the equal protection clause of
death of the tortfeasor 8was
7
the state constitution.
84. See White v. Hughes, 257 Ark. 627, 519 S.W.2d 70 (1975), appealdismissed for
want of substantialfederal question, 423 U.S. 805 (1975); Cannon v. Oviatt, 520 P.2d
883 (Utah 1974); appeal dismissed for want of substantialfederal question, 419 U.S.
810 (1974).
85. See, e.g., Brown v. Merlo, 8 Cal. 3d 855, 506 P.2d 212, 106 Cal. Rptr. 388
(1973), and Manistee Bank & Trust Co. v. McGowan, 394 Mich. 655, 232 N.W.2d 636
(1975).
86. In addition to California and Michigan, guest statutes have been invalidated
by state courts in the following states: Idaho, Thompson v. Hagan, 96 Idaho 19, 523
P.2d 1365 (1974); Iowa, Bierkamp v. Rogers, 293 N.W.2d 577 (Iowa 1980); Kansas,
Henry v. Bauder, 213 Kan. 751, 518 P.2d 362 (1974); Nevada, Laakonen v. Eighth
Judicial Dist. Court, 91 Nev. 506, 538 P.2d 574 (1975); New Mexico, McGeehan v.
Bunch, 88 N.M. 308, 540 P.2d 238 (1975); North Dakota, Johnson v. Hassett, 217
N.W.2d 771 (N.D. 1974); Ohio, Primes v. Tyler, 43 Ohio St. 2d 195, 331 N.E.2d 723
(1975); South Carolina, Ramey v. Ramey, 273 S.C. 680, 258 S.E.2d 883 (1979); Utah,
Malan v. Lewis, P.2d (No. 17606, Utah 1984); Wyoming, Nehring v. Russell, 582 P.2d
67 (Wyo. 1978). Guest statutes have been upheld by state courts against constitutional challenges in the following states: Arkansas, White v. Hughes, 257 Ark.
627, 519 S.W.2d 70 (1975); Colorado, Richardson v. Hansen, 186 Colo. 346, 527 P.2d
536 (1974); Delaware, Justice v. Gatchell, 325 A.2d 97 (Del. 1974); Indiana, Sidle v.
Majors, 264 Ind. 206, 341 N.E.2d 763 (1976); Oregon, Duerst v. Limbocker, 269 Ore.
252, 525 P.2d 99 (1974).
87. Thompson v. Estate of Petroff, 319 N.W.2d 400 (Minn. 1982).
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In recent years, a number of states have enacted legislation designed to limit liability for medical malpractice, and some of these
efforts have been held to run afoul of the state constitution. In Carson v. Maurer,"s the New Hampshire Supreme Court, expressly in89
voking the "fair and substantial relationship" standard of review,
invalidated on state equal protection grounds the following provisions: (1) a requirement that an expert witness be an expert in the
field at the time the defendant rendered the allegedly negligent
care; (2) a two-year limitation period except for those whose actions
were based upon the discovery of a foreign object in the injured
person's body; (3) a ban on minors bringing a malpractice action
within two years from the time the disability is removed, which
tolling period was available to other minor plaintiffs; (4) a requirement of prior notice to the defendant in a medical malpractice action
as a condition for bringing suit; (5) the abolition of the collateral
source rule in medical malpractice actions; and (6) a provision for
periodic payments in malpractice actions.90 Limitations on the
amount recoverable in malpractice actions have also been held to
violate the North Dakota equal protection clause. 9 1 Particular provisions singling out malpractice actions for differential treatment
have also been invalidated in other states.9 2

88. 120 N.H. 925, 424 A.2d 825 (1980).
89. Id. at 931-32, 424 A.2d at 830. "We now conclude that the rights involved
herein are sufficiently important to require that the restrictions imposed on those
rights be subjected to a more rigorous judicial scrutiny than allowed under the rational basis test." Id.
90. The court also concluded that the invalid provisions of the law were not
severable from the valid provisions and held the law to be invalid in its entirety. Id.
at 945-46, 424 A.2d at 839. But see Barme v. Wood, 37 Cal. 3d 174, 689 P.2d 446, 207
Cal. Rptr. 816 (1984); American Bank & Trust Co. v. Community Hosp., 36 Cal. 3d
359, 683 P.2d 670, 204 Cal. Rptr. 816 (1984); Sibley v. Board of Supervisors of
Louisiana State University, No. 84-C-0571, slip op. (La. Jan. 14, 1985).
91. Arneson v. Olson, 270 N.W.2d 125 (N.D. 1978).
92. See Kenyon v. Hammer,
- Ariz.
., 688 P.2d 961 (1984) (statute of
limitations bar computed from time of injury rather than time of discovery); Clark v.
Singer, 250 Ga. 470, 298 S.E.2d 484 (1983) (shorter statute of limitations in wrongful
death actions based on malpractice); Schwan v. Riverside Methodist Hosp., 6 Ohio St.
2d 300, 452 N.E.2d 1337 (1983) (limitations period in malpractice actions not tolled
during minority); Boucher v. Sayeed, 459 A.2d 87 (R.I. 1983) (trial of certain issues by
the judge rather than the jury); Sax v. Votteler, 648 S.W.2d 661 (Tex. 1983) (limitations period as applied to minors). However, in Nelson v. Krusen, 52 U.S.L.W. 2325
(Tex. Oct. 16, 1983) the Texas Supreme Court upheld the statute of limitations bar
computed from the time of injury rather than from the time of discovery.
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In a similar vein a requirement of notice to the governmental
defendant in a tort action was held by the Michigan Supreme Court
to intrude upon the state equal protection clause, 9 3 and the Montana Supreme Court held that a limitation on damages recoverable
against the governmental defendant in a tort action denied equal
protection to the plaintiff therein. 94 In recent years, some state
courts have invalidated particular statutes of limitations provisions
under the equal protection, due process, or "open courts" clauses of
the state constitution. 95
A final example of invalidation under a state constitution of a law
governing the rights of parties in private litigation is the decision of
the California Supreme Court in Hale v. Morgan.96 There a state
law imposed a civil penalty of $100 per day against a landlord who
willfully deprived the tenant of utility services for the purpose of
evicting him. In the case at bar, the literal application of the law
would have required payment of $17,300 by an individual landlord
to a tenant. The court held that insofar as the law required a mandatory, cumulative penalty, without regard to particular circumstances or
the landlord's degree of fault, it was violative of due
7
9

process.

As stated at the outset of this discussion, the area of state economic and social regulation furnishes the best opportunity for state
courts to provide constitutional protection far beyond that provided
by the federal Constitution. Numerous cases have been reviewed in
which state courts have given substantial scrutiny to particular
economic and social regulations and have invalidated them, usually

93. Reich v. State Highway Dep't, 386 Mich. 617, 194 N.W.2d 700 (1972).
94. White v. State, 661 P.2d 1272 (Mont. 1983).
95. See Lankford v. Sullivan, 416 So. 2d 996 (Ala. 1982) (products liability statute
of limitations violates due process); State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. All Electric,
Inc., __
Nev.
-, 660 P.2d 995 (1983) (different statute of limitations for suits
against building contractors violates equal protection); Heath v. Sears, Roebuck &
Co., 123 N.H. 512, 464 A.2d 288 (1983) (different statute of limitations in product
liability actions violates equal protection); Broome v. Truluck, 270 S.C. 227, 241
S.E.2d 739 (1978) (special limitation period in actions against architect, engineer or
contractor to recover damages for deficiency in design violates equal protection);
Daugaard v. Baltic Cooperative Building Supply Association, 349 N.W.2d 419 (S.D.
1984) (statute of limitations bar in construction actions computed from the time of
completion and in products liability actions computed from the time of delivery
violates "open courts" provision).
96. 22 Cal. 3d 388, 584 P.2d 512, 149 Cal. Rptr. 375 (1978).
97. Id. at 405, 584 P.2d at 523, 149 Cal. Rptr. at 386.
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under the due process and equal protection clauses of the state constitution. It should not be forgotten, however, that a number of other
state courts continue to follow the very deferential approach to economic and social regulation favored by the United States Supreme
Court. The point to be emphasized is that the capacity of the state
constitution to serve as a source of supplemental protection of individual rights in this area is considerable. And, as illustrated by
the many recent cases invalidating state laws regulating the rights
of parties in civil litigation, the state courts may now be more disposed to utilize the state constitution to close the gap in protection
left by the Supreme Court's highly deferential approach to the constitutionality of state economic and social regulation.
B.

Privacy, Associational and Expression Interests

The capacity of the state constitution to serve as a source of constitutional protection of privacy and associational interests is precisely defined because the gap in protection left by the United States
Supreme Court's decisions is clear. The Supreme Court has extended substantial protection to certain kinds of privacy and associational interests under the due process and equal protection
clauses, but has made it clear that other of these rights will receive
little or no protection under the federal Constitution. The Court has
held that reproductive freedom, and marriage and family interests
involve "fundamental rights," and thus, has generally invalidated
98
state laws or governmental action interfering with these interests.
But the "right of privacy" has not been extended beyond those interests. The Supreme Court has summarily held that the federal
Constitution does not protect either sexual freedom on the part of
unmarried persons 99 or the use of drugs. 0 0° It has held that the
98. See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (involving both reproductive freedom and marital privacy). Although the court in Griswold treated the
"right of privacy" as an independent constitutional right, the Court in Roe v. Wade,
410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973), said that the "right of privacy" was a part of the "liberty"
protected by substantive due process. Marriage and family interests were explicitly
recognized as involving "fundamental rights" in Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374
(1978), and Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977).
99. Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney, 425 U.S. 901 (1976), sum. affg., 403 F.
Supp. 1199 (E.D. Va. 1975) (three-judge court).
100. Strictly speaking, the Court has refused to grant review in any of the cases
where the state appellate court or the federal court of appeals has held that the
federal Constitution does not protect the use of drugs. See, e.g., State v. Smith, 93
Wash. 2d 329, 610 P.2d 869, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 873 (1980).
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states are not constitutionally required to facilitate the exercise of
reproductive freedom, such as by providing medicaid funding for
abortion. 1 ' It has protected the right of family members to live
together in the same household 10 2 but has upheld the power of the
states to limit the ability of unrelated persons to live together' 0 3 in
the same household. Thus, the critical question is whether state
constitutions will be interpreted as providing protection for particular privacy and associational interests that the United States
Supreme Court has held to be unprotected under the federal Constitution.
The pattern that emerges is that some state courts have decided to
provide such additional protection, while others have not. New
Jersey 10 4 and New York' 0 5 have invalidated, on due process
grounds, laws prohibiting sexual relationships between unmarried
consenting adults, and Pennsylvania has done the same on equal
protection grounds.'0 6 Other states, in contrast, have upheld such
laws.'1 7 Challenges to prohibitions on drug use under the state constitution generally have been unavailing. 0 8 The only exception is
Alaska which has held that the "right to privacy" clause of the state
constitution precludes the state from sanctioning an individual's
09
use of marijuana in the home.'
Some states have held that the state constitution protects the
right of unrelated individuals to live together in the same household, contrary to the United States Supreme Court's holding in Belle
Terre. Zoning laws requiring single-family occupancy and defining

101. Williams v. Zbaraz, 448 U.S. 358 (1980); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977).
102. Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977).
103. Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974).
104. State v. Saunders, 75 N.J. 200, 381 A.2d 333 (1977).
105. People v. Onofre, 51 N.Y.2d 476, 415 N.E.2d 936 (1980) (decided on federal
constitutional grounds), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 987 (1981).
106. Commonwealth v. Bonadio, 490 Pa. 91, 415 A.2d 47 (1980). The court used an
equal protection analysis, focusing on the fact that the law prohibited consensual oral
or anal sex by unmarried persons, while permitting the same by married persons.
107. See, e.g., Kelly v. State, 45 Md. App. 212, 412 A.2d 1274 (1980), affd. sub nom.
Neville v. State, 290 Md. 364, 430 A.2d 570 (1981); State v. Santos, 413 A.2d 58 (R.I.
1980).
108. See the cases cited in Developments, supra note 32, at 1431 n.8.
109. Ravin v. State, 537 P.2d 494 (Alaska 1975). The Alaska Supreme Court,
however, has upheld all other restrictions on drug use. See generally Developments,
supra note 107, at 1441.
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single-family in terms of relationship by blood or marriage have
been invalidated under the due process clauses of the state constitution in Michigan1 10 and New Jersey,1 11 and under the "right to
privacy" clause of the California Constitution.1 12 Michigan has also
held that a zoning regulation that excluded all mobile homes from
residential zones not designated as mobile home 1parks
infringed on
13
the due process clause of the state constitution.
Other forms of privacy and associational interests have also been
protected by state courts. The Supreme Court of California, relying
on the "right to privacy" clause of the state constitution,1 14 has held
that the police could not obtain a depositor's bank records or credit
charge records without a warrant. 115 The New York Court of Appeals has held that the due process clause of the New York Constitution requires that pretrial detainees in county jails be given contact
visits of reasonable duration. 116 The New Jersey Supreme Court
found a right under its constitution for a comatose person to be
taken off an artificial life-support system. 117 Finally, some state
courts have found that parents subject to termination of parental
rights proceedings have greater guarantees under the state constitution, such as the1 right
to counsel, than are afforded under the
8
federal Constitution.
110. Charter Township of Delta v. Dinolfo, 419 Mich. 253, 351 N.W.2d 831 (1984).
111. State v. Baker, 81 N.J. 99, 405 A.2d 368 (1979).
112. City of Santa Barbara v. Adamson, 27 Cal. 3d 123,610 P.2d 436, 164 Cal. Rptr.
539 (1980).
113. Robinson Township v. Knoll, 410 Mich. 293, 302 N.W.2d 146 (1981).
114. On the "right to privacy" clause of the California Constitution, see generally
Gerstein, California'sConstitutionalRight to Privacy: The Development of the Protection of Private Life, 9 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 385 (1982).
115. People v. Blair, 25 Cal. 3d 640, 602 P.2d 738, 159 Cal. Rptr. 818 (1979);
Burrows v. Superior Court, 13 Cal. 3d 238, 529 P.2d 590, 118 Cal. Rptr. 166 (1974).
116. Cooper v. Morin, 49 N.Y.2d 69, 399 N.E.2d 1188 (1979).
117. In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976). Cf.
People v. Privitera, 23 Cal. 3d 697, 591 P.2d 919, 153 Cal. Rptr. 431 (California
Supreme Court held that the "right of privacy" did not include the right of a terminally ill cancer patient to be treated with laetrile), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 949
(1979).
118. In Lassiter v. Department of Social Services, 452 U.S. 18 (1981), the United
States Supreme Court held that due process did not require the appointment of
counsel in all termination of parental rights cases involving indigent parents, and
left the appointment of counsel in such cases to be determined by the courts on a
case-by-case basis. Some state courts have held that counsel must be appointed in all
cases involving termination of parental rights. See V.F. v. State, 666 P.2d 42 (Alaska
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In the area of expression interests, there is really very little
opportunity for the state constitution to serve as a source of additional protection because so much protection is already provided
under the federal Constitution. Most of the cases asserting free expression claims under the state constitution involve access to
privately-owned shopping centers or other facilities, which is not
protected under the first amendment because of the "state action"
requirement. 119 A right of access to privately-owned shopping centers under the free expression clause of the state constitution has
been recognized in California, 12 ° Washington, 12 1 and Massachusetts.1 22 A right to equal access to the facilities of a private
university has been recognized in New Jersey' 23 and Pennsylvania. 124 The state constitution also could be interpreted as providing additional protection with respect to particular forms of
expression that the Supreme Court has held are not protected by the
first amendment, such as obscenity, 1 25 or nude dancing in liquor
establishments.' 26 While no state court has yet held that obscenity
is protected by the free expression clause of the state constitution,

1983); Reist v. Bay Circuit Judge, 396 Mich. 326, 241 N.W.2d 55 (1976) (plurality
opinion). See also In re C.G., 637 P.2d 66 (Okla. 1981), where the Oklahoma Supreme
Court held that the Oklahoma Constitution required the use of the "clear and convincing" standard of proof in termination of parental rights proceedings prior to the
time that the United States Supreme Court held that this standard was required by
the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment in Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S.
745 (1982).
119. Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507 (1976).
120. Robins v. Pruneyard Shopping Center, 23 Cal. 3d 899, 592 P.2d 341, 153 Cal.
Rptr. 854 (1979). In Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980), the
United States Supreme Court held that recognition of a right of access to privatelyowned shopping centers under the state constitution did not violate the first amendment or due process rights of the shopping center.
121. Alderwood Assocs. v. Washington Envtl. Council, 96 Wash. 2d 230, 635 P.2d
108 (1981).
122. Batchelder v. Allied Stores International, 388 Mass. 83, 445 N.E.2d 590
(1983).
123. State v. Schmid, 84 N.J. 535,423 A.2d 615 (1980), appeal dismissed, 455 U.S.
100 (1982).
124. Commonwealth v. Tate, 495 Pa. 158, 431 A.2d 1382 (1981).
125. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
126. California v. LaRue, 409 U.S. 109 (1972) (twenty-first amendment qualifies
the first amendment with respect to state regulation of liquor establishments).
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the New York Court of Appeals and the Massachusetts Supreme
Court have held that a ban on topless dancing in liquor establishments is violative of the free expression clauses of the state constitution. 127 Finally, particular questions of protection of expression
could be resolved differently under the state constitution than they
by the United States Supreme Court under the
have been resolved
128
first amendment.
The most striking feature that emerges from analysis of state
court decisions extending greater protection to privacy, associational and expression interests under the state constitution is that these
cases are concentrated in relatively few states, California and New
Jersey being the most prominent. This suggests that the major factor influencing the results in these cases has been the willingness of
the particular state court to make value judgments about the relative importance of the conflicting individual and governmental interests contrary to the value judgments made by the United States
Supreme Court. The results reached by the United States Supreme
Court can only be explained in terms of that Court's value judg29
ments as to the relative importance of the conflicting interests.'
The same explanation is submitted for the results reached by state
courts under the state constitution. The existence of a specific constitutional guarantee protecting privacy does not appear to be significant. California has a "right of privacy" provision, but New
Jersey does not, and no cases invalidating state laws interfering
with these interests have been decided in the number of other states
that do have "right of privacy" provisions. 130 Unlike economic regulation cases, these cases do not lend themselves to explanation in
terms of the degree of scrutiny that the court gives to the relationship between the law's provisions and the accomplishment of the
law's asserted purpose. Rather, the courts have stressed the importance of the individual interest involved, and have found that the

127. Bellanca v. New York State Liquor Auth., 54 N.Y.2d 228, 429 N.E.2d 765
(1981); Commonwealth v. Sees, 374 Mass. 532, 373 N.E.2d 1151 (1978).
128. In other words, the state courts could strike the constitutional balance in favor
of expression in circumstances where the United States Supreme Court has struck
the constitutional balance in favor of the asserted governmental interest. See, e.g.,
Colten v. Kentucky, 407 U.S. 104 (1972).
129. Compare Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974) with Moore v. East
Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977).
130. Eleven states have "right of privacy" provisions in their state constitutions.
See Linde, supra note 3, at 182 n.41.
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asserted governmental interests were not of sufficient importance to
justify interference with the individual interest.13 1
The submission, then, is that some state courts have interpreted
the state constitution as affording greater protection to privacy and
associational interests 132 than is afforded by the federal Constitution because they have made a different value judgment about the
relative importance of the conflicting individual and governmental
interests. In this sense, these courts are more "activist" than the
United States Supreme Court has been, and are more willing to
uphold claims of individual autonomy. As a result, in some states,
the state constitution has been interpreted as providing protection
for particularprivacy and associational interests that the United
States Supreme Court has held to be unprotected under the federal
Constitution. 133
C. Equality of School Financingand Medicaid Funding For
Abortions: A Study in Reactive State Constitutional
Interpretation
As discussed earlier, state constitutional law in practice is reactive to federal constitutional law. In most cases involving constitutional challenges under the state constitution, the real issue is
whether the state court will reach a different result under the state
constitution than the United States Supreme Court has reached
under the federal Constitution. The responsiveness of state constitutional interpretation appears most clearly in the areas of equality of school financing and medicaid funding for abortion. Here, the
challenges under the state constitutions have been brought in the
wake of Supreme Court decisions squarely rejecting such challenges
under the federal Constitution. This reactive nature is demonstrated most cogently in these two areas because the same kind of

131. Where the United States Supreme Court has reached a contrary result, it has
been because it struck the balance in favor of the asserted governmental interest over
the individual interest. See supra note 129 and accompanying text.
132. There has been relatively little additional protection to expression interests
under the state constitutions because of the extensive amount of protection to expression interests that already is afforded under the federal Constitution. See supra notes
119-28 and accompanying text.
133. Particular individual interests are sometimes protected by specific provisions
of the state constitution. Justice Linde notes, for example, that Georgia and Oregon
have specific provisions commanding humane treatment of persons arrested or in
prison. Linde, supra note 3, at 182.
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value determinations that provided the foundation for the United
States Supreme Court decisions were also the basis for the state
court decisions. To put it another way, there was nothing distinctive
about the process by which the United States Supreme Court, on the
one hand, and the state courts, on the other hand, decided whether
equality of school financing and medicaid funding for abortions
were required by the respective federal and state constitutions.
With regard to equality of school financing, the United States Supreme Court made the value judgment that the federal Constitution
should not be used to require the states to restructure their systems
of school financing, despite the inequities that property-based school
financing systems produce for students attending school in property-poor districts. The state courts had to make the same kind of
value judgment as to restructuring when the challenge was brought
under the state constitution. The results in state court cases, which
saw some state courts upholding and others rejecting such challenges, can only be explained in terms of differing value judgments
as to the propriety of using the state constitution to require
restructuring of the system of school financing. In the matter of
medicaid funding for abortion, the United States Supreme Court
decided that the state, when acting as dispenser of benefits, could
advance the interest in protecting potential human life by refusing
to provide medicaid funding for abortion. The state courts that have
invalidated such restrictions under the state constitution simply
made the opposite decision.
Constitutional challenges to systems of school financing involve
what may be called restructuring litigation. Here, a holding of unconstitutionality does not operate negatively so as to prevent the
state from interfering with individual rights.1 34 It goes beyond a
mere prohibition against certain conduct in that it requires the
state to extend certain benefits to an excluded group 3 5 and, more
importantly, necessitates a fundamental change in the method by
which the state allocates its resources. There will be a con-

134. For example, the Supreme Court in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), prohibited state restrictions on a woman's ability to obtain an abortion. The effect of the
holding was to prohibit the states from enforcing anti-abortion laws, but the decision
did not require the states to do anything affirmatively.
135. See, e.g., Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971) (state may not deny
welfare benefits to resident aliens); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (state
may not impose durational residency requirement as a condition for eligibility for
welfare benefits).
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stitutionally required reallocation of state resources, and possibly a
significant alteration of state taxation and fiscal policy. Thus, the
value choice is very clear. There is no doubt that systems of school
financing based on school district wealth work to the disadvantage
of students living in property-poor districts by providing these students with less in the way of tangible educational benefits 136 than is
provided to students living in property-rich districts. But if such
systems of school financing are declared to be unconstitutional,
there will have to be a judicially-ordered restructuring of school
financing, with far-reaching resource allocation and fiscal consequence. 137
In San Antonio Independent School District v.Rodriguez,'38 the
United States Supreme Court determined that the fourteenth
amendment's equal protection clause would not be used to require a
restructuring of state systems of school financing. Justice Powell,
writing for the Court, was very explicit in regard to this value judgment:
[T]his case represents far more than a challenge to the manner in
which Texas provides for the education of its children. We have here
nothing less than a direct attack on the way in which Texas has chosen
to raise and disburse state and local tax revenues. We are asked to
condemn the State's judgment in conferring on political subdivisions
the power to tax local property to supply revenues for local interests. In
so doing, appellees would have the Court intrude in an area in which it
has traditionally deferred to state legislatures. This Court has often
admonished against such interferences with the State's fiscal policies
139
under the Equal Protection Clause ....
Justice Powell also emphasized the complexity of the problems of
school financing, noting that: "[I]n such a complex arena in which
136. Tangible educational benefits refer to the quantifiable inputs of education,
such as course offerings and teachers' salaries. While states defending property-based
systems of school financing argue that it is impossible to quantify "equality of educational opportunity," it cannot be denied, as one court has emphasized, that there is a
direct relationship between per pupil expenditures and the breadth and quality of
educational programs. Horton v. Meskill, 172 Conn. 615, 634-35, 376 A.2d 359, 368
(1977). For further discussion of the argument that "money doesn't matter," see
Washakie County School District No. One v. Herschler, 606 P.2d 310, 334 (Wyo.
1980).
137. There also must be ongoing judicial supervision of equalizing efforts.
138. 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
139. Id. at 40 (footnote omitted).

Winter 1985]

ARTICLE VIII

no perfect alternatives exist, the Court does well not to impose too
rigorous a standard of scrutiny lest all local fiscal schemes become
subjects of criticism under the Equal Protection Clause."14 Finally,
Justice Powell saw federalism considerations as militating against
"constitutionalizing" the matter of school financing under the federal Constitution:
[I]t must be remembered, also, that every claim arising under the
Equal Protection Clause has implications for the relationship between
national and state power under our federal system.., it would be difficult to imagine a case having a greater potential impact on our federal
system than the one now before us, in which we are urged to abrogate
systems of financing public education presently in existence in virtually every State."'
In order to implement this value judgment and uphold the challenged system of school financing, it was necessary for the Court to
remove the case from a "strict scrutiny" standard of review. The
lower court had invoked "strict scrutiny" and had invalidated the
Texas system of school financing on the ground that it did not advance "compelling governmental interests" by the "least drastic
means."1'42 The Supreme Court noted: "Texas virtually concedes
that its historically rooted dual system of financing education could
not withstand the strict judicial scrutiny that this Court has found
appropriate in reviewing legislative classifications that interfere
with fundamental constitutional rights or that involve suspect
classifications. '143 The Court avoided application of the "strict scrutiny" standard of review by holding that classifications on the basis
of school district wealth were not "suspect,"14 4 and that education
did not involve a "fundamental right" for purposes of the two-tier
standard of equal protection review. 145 On the latter point, the
Court held that what constituted a "fundamental right" for equal
protection purposes did not depend on the relative importance of the
right in relation to other rights, but on whether the right was "explicitly or implicitly guaranteed by the Constitution, '"146 which the
140. Id. at 41 (footnote omitted).
141. Id. at 44.
142. Id. at 16-17.
143. Id. at 16 (footnotes omitted).
144. Id. at 18-28.
145. Id. at 29-37.
146. Id. at 33-34.
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right to education was not. 147 Thus, the challenged system of school
financing was subject to review under the more deferential "rational
basis" standard, and was found to be "rationally related" to the
14 8
state's interest in maintaining local control over school financing.
The Supreme Court's decision in Rodriguez set the stage for challenges to systems of school financing under the state constitution.
At the time of Rodriguez, the California Supreme Court, in Serrano
v. Priest (Serrano ),49 had held the California system of school
financing was violative of equal protection. That court's analysis
was based entirely on the federal Constitution, but in a footnote the
court also noted that the same result would prevail under the state
constitution.1 50 After subsequent legislative modifications in the
system of school financing took place, the California Supreme Court
held that these modifications did not cure the inequality found to
exist in Serrano I.151 It then rejected the Supreme Court's analysis
in Rodriguez,1 5 2 applied strict scrutiny, and invalidated the system
under the equal protection clause of the Califorof school financing
153
nia Constitution.
A number of other state courts have invalidated systems of school
financing under a state constitution in the wake of Rodriguez, but
even more state courts have upheld the financing system. In addition to California, property-based systems of school financing have
1 56
154
Connecticut, 155 Washington,
been invalidated in New Jersey,
Arkansas, 1 57 Wyoming, 5 8 and West Virginia.1 5 9 Constitutional
147. Id. at 35-39.
148. Id. at 44-45.
149. 5 Cal. 3d 584, 487 P.2d 1241, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601 (1971).
150. Id. at 596 n.ll, 487 P.2d at 1249, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 609.
151. Serrano v. Priest (SerranoII), 18 Cal. 3d 728, 557 P.2d 929, 135 Cal. Rptr. 345
(1977).
152. The California Supreme Court found Rodriguez to have been based on
"federalism constraints." Id. at 766-67, 557 P.2d at 952, 135 Cal. Rtpr. at 367-68.
153. Id. at 776-77, 557 P.2d at 958, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 374.
154. Robinson v. Cahill, 62 N.J. 473, 303 A.2d 273, supplemented, 63 N.J. 196, 306
A.2d 65 (1973), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 913 (1975). For further proceedings see Robinson v. Cahill, 69 N.J. 449, 355 A.2d 129 (1976); Karcher v. Byrne, 79 N.J. 358, 399
A.2d 644 (1979).
155. Horton v. Meskill, 172 Conn. 615, 376 A.2d 359 (1977).
156. Seattle School Dist. No. One v. State, 90 Wash. 2d 476, 585 P.2d 71 (1978) (en
banc).
157. Dupree v. Alma School Dist. No. 30, 279 Ark. 340, 651 S.W.2d 90 (1983).
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challenges to such systems of school financing have been squarely
rejected in New York, 160 Ohio, 161 Arizona, 16 2 Colorado,1 6 3
Georgia, 164 Idaho,' 6 5 Oregon,1 66 Maryland, 167 and Michigan.' 6 8 It is
difficult to explain the differing results in these cases other than in
terms of differing value judgments as to the propriety of using the
state constitution to require a restructuring of the school financing
system.
Every state constitution has an "education clause," and virtually
all of these clauses impose an affirmative duty on the legislature to
establish and maintain public schools. 1 69 Typically, these clauses
refer to the duty of the legislature to "establish a thorough and
efficient system of free public schools,"' 70 or to "maintain and establish a public school system,"' 7 1 or to make "ample provision for
the education of all children.' 7 2 All of these provisions were promulgated at some time in the past or trace back to predecessor
provisions in earlier constitutions.
The existence of these provisions could influence constitutional
challenges to systems of school financing under the state constitution in two ways. First, they could provide an independent ground of
challenge, apart from equal protection. It could be contended that

158. Washakie County School Dist. No. One v. Herschler, 606 P.2d 310 (Wyo.
1980).
159. Pauley v. Kelley, 255 S.E.2d 859 (W. Va. 1979).
160. Bd. of Educ., Levittown Union Free School Dist. v. Nyquist, 57 N.Y.2d 27, 439
N.E.2d 359, 453 N.Y.S.2d 643 (1982), appeal dismissed, 459 U.S. 1138-39 (1983).
161. Bd. Educ. of Cincinnati v. Walter, 58 Ohio St. 2d 368, 390 N.E.2d 813 (1979),
cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1015 (1980).
162. Shofstall v. Hollins, 110 Ariz. 88, 515 P.2d 590 (1973) (en banc).
163. Lujan v. Colorado State Bd. of Educ., 649 P.2d 1005 (Colo. 1982). "
164. McDaniel v. Thomas, 248 Ga. 6342, 285 S.E.2d 156 (1981).
165. Thompson v. Engelking, 96 Idaho 793, 537 P.2d 635 (1975).
166. Olsen v. State ex rel Johnson, 276 Or. 9, 554 P.2d 139 (1976).
167. Hornbeck v. Somerset County Bd. of Educ., 295 Md. 597, 458 A.2d 758 (1983).
168. East Jackson Public Schools v. State, 133 Mich. App. 132, 348 N.W.2d 303
(1984). The author was counsel for the unsuccessful plaintiffs in this case.
169. See the discussion and review of state constitutional provisions in Developments, supra note 31, at 1446-47.
170. See N.J. & W. VA. CONSTS.
171. See ARIZ., MICH. & N.Y. CONSTS.
172. See WASH. CONST.
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these provisions impose on the state the obligation to provide equality of educational support, so that a system of school financing that
results in disparities in the amount of public funds available for the
education of different children, depending on the property wealth of
the district in which those children reside, violates the education
clause of the state constitution. 1 73 Second, the existence of the
education clause means that the right to an education is specifically
guaranteed by the state constitution. Therefore, if a state court follows the Rodriguez text of "explicitly" or "implicitly guaranteed by
the constitution," education would be a "fundamental right" for
equal protection purposes, and the constitutionality of the school
financing system would be tested under the "strict scrutiny" standard of review.
What has happened in practice is that state courts have simply
disagreed on the impact of the education clause on the state's
obligation to provide equality of school financing and on whether
education is a "fundamental right" for purposes of equal protection
analysis. Those state courts that have invalidated property-based
systems of school financing have emphasized the state's obligation
to support public education, and have found that the existence of
substantial inequalities in the amount of public funds available for
the education of children living in different school districts was inconsistent with the nature of that obligation. Some of these courts
based their decisions primarily on the education clause, 174 while
others related the state's obligation under the education clause to
the denial of equal protection resulting from the disparities in funds
available for the education of children residing in different school
districts.' 7 5 On the other hand, the state courts that have upheld the

173. This is a distillation of the argument that the author presented in the Michigan litigation. See supra note 168.
174. See Horton v. Meskill, 172 Conn. 615, 376 A.2d 359 (1977); Robinson v. Cahill,
69 N.J. 449, 355 A.2d 129 (1976) (see also supra note 154); Seattle School Dist. No.
One v. State, 90 Wash. 2d 476,585 P.2d 71 (1978). In Pauley v. Kelley, 255 S.E.2d 859
(W. Va. 1979), the court found that as a result of inequities in school financing, school
children in a number of districts were not receiving a "thorough and efficient education." Id. at 878. The court held that the education clause required that the legislature quantify standards for a "thorough and efficient education," and that the quality
of education provided by the different school districts be tested against those standards. Id.
175. See Dupree v. Alma School Dist. No. 30, 279 Ark. 340, 651 S.W.2d 90 (1983);
Serrano v. Priest, 18 Cal. 3d 728, 557 P.2d 929, 135 Cal. Rptr. 345 (1977); Washakie
County School Dist. No. One v. Herschler, 606 P.2d 310 (Wyo. 1980).
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constitutionality of property-based systems of school financing have
interpreted the education clause as merely requiring the state to
provide a "minimally adequate education" for all children and not
as imposing any obligation of equality in funding. 176 Since all states
have an education clause in the state constitution, and since these
clauses generally have similar terminology and historical origin,
there is no objective way to explain the differing interpretations of
the education clause in the context of equality of school financing.
Similarly, the state courts that have invalidated the challenged
system of school financing have found education to be a "fundamental right" and thus have invoked the "strict scrutiny" standard of review.1 77 Those courts that have upheld the challenged
system, in contrast, have invoked the "rational basis" standard of
review, and like the United States Supreme Court in Rodriguez,
have found the system to be rationally related to promoting local
control over school financing. Some courts have simply cited Rodriguez for the proposition that education does not involve a "fundamental right., 178 Other courts, recognizing the doctrinal bind
that would result if they followed the Rodriguez test, have concluded that the test is not appropriate to determine "fundamental
rights" for purposes of the state constitution's equal protection
clause. 179 Either way, the rational basis standard of review has been
applied, and the challenged system of school financing has been
upheld. Again, there is no objective way in which to explain the
differing conclusions of the state courts as to whether education is a
"fundamental right" for purposes of the equal protection clause of
the state constitution.
The only plausible explanation for the different results in challenges to property-based systems of school financing under the state
176. See, e.g., Hornbeck v. Somerset County Bd. of Educ., 295 Md. 597, 458 A.2d
758 (1983); East Jackson Public Schools v. State, 133 Mich. App. 132, 348 N.W.2d 303
(1984); Bd.ofEduc., Levittown Union Free School Dist. v. Nyquist, 57 N.Y.2d 27,439
N.E.2d 359, 453 N.Y.S.2d 643 (1982), appeal dismissed, 459 U.S. 1138 (1983); Olsen
v. State, 276 Or. 9, 554 P.2d 139 (1976).
177. In Dupree v. Alma School Dist. No. 30, 379 Ark. 340, 651 S.W.2d 90 (1983),
however, the court invalidated the system of school financing under the purportedly
less restrictive "rational basis" standard of review.
178. See, e.g., Lujan v. Colorado State Bd. of Educ., 649 P.2d 1005 (Colo. 1982).
179. See Shofstall v. Hollins, 110 Ariz. 88, 515 P.2d 590 (1973); McDaniel v. Thomas, 248 Ga. 632, 285 S.E.2d 156 (1981); Thompson v. Engelking, 96 Idaho 793, 537
P.2d 635 (1975); Hornbeck v. Somerset County Bd. of Educ., 295 Md. 597, 458 A.2d
758 (1983).
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constitution is that the different state courts have made different
value judgments as to the propriety of using the state constitution to
require a restructuring of the system of school financing. These
state court evaluations are no different than the value judgments
made by the United States Supreme Court with respect to the fourteenth amendment's equal protection clause in Rodriguez. Thus,
state constitutional law in this area is clearly reactive to federal
constitutional law. Some state courts have followed the lead of the
United States Supreme Court in Rodriguez as to the "restructuring"
value judgment, while others have not.
The same reactive nature of state constitutional interpretation
appears in state court decisions dealing with challenges under the
state constitution to prohibitions on medicaid funding for abortion.
182
18
In Maher v. Roe,1 8 0 Harris v. McRae, ' and Williams v. Zbaraz,
the United States Supreme Court held that bans on medicaid funding for abortions were not contrary to the due process or equal protection clauses of the federal Constitution. 183 Although abortion had
been held to be a "fundamental right," 18 4 the Court held in these
cases that the state is not required to "subsidize" the exercise of this
"fundamental right" by providing medicaid funding for abortions,
notwithstanding the fact that it provided medicaid funding for
other medical procedures. The state could constitutionally provide
medicaid funding for pregnancy, but not for abortion, because the
states may "make a value judgment favoring childbirth over abortion, and... implement that judgment by the allocation of public
funds."'1 85 In effect, the Court held that while the state, when acting
as regulator, could not advance the interest in protecting potential
life until the stage of viability had been reached, 18 6 it could, when
acting as dispenser of benefits, advance that interest from the mo18 7
ment of conception by denying medicaid funding for abortion.

180. 432 U.S. 464 (1977).
181. 448 U.S. 297 (1980).
182. 448 U.S. 358 (1980).
183. Maher,432 U.S. at 470; Harris,448 U.S. at 317-18; Zbaraz, 448 U.S. at 369.
184. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
185. 432 U.S. at 474.
186. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. at 113.
187. As Justice White stated, concurring in Harris v. McRae:
Maher held that the government need not fund elective abortions because withholding funds rationally furthered the State's legitimate interest in normal
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Following these cases, the denial of medicaid funding for abortion
has been challenged as an intrusion on the state constitution in a
few states. The challenge has been sustained, as applied to all abortions in California 88 and Massachusetts, 1 89 and as applied to therapeutic abortions in New Jersey. 9 0° The Massachusetts and New
Jersey decisions clearly follow the United States Supreme Court
decisions in Maher and Harris,but strike the constitutional balance
differently. The Massachusetts Supreme Court based its decision on
the due process clause of the state constitution, and concluded that
the ban on medicaid funding for abortions "impermissibly burdens a
right protected by our constitutional guarantee of due process."' 9 1 It
focused on the discrimination effected by the denial of medicaid
funding for abortions, and said that in the allocation of governmental benefits, the state, "may not use criteria which discriminatorily burden the exercise of a fundamental right.'' 19 2 The
court also expressly engaged in "interest balancing." It balanced
the state's interest in the protection of potential human life against
the pregnant woman's interest in having an abortion, and took the
position that, "we think the balance in this case to be decisively in
favor of the individual right involved."1'93 In other words, contrary
to the value judgment made by the United States Supreme Court in
Maher and Harris, the Massachusetts Supreme Court made the

childbirth. We sustained this policy even though under Roe v. Wade, the government's interest in fetal life is an inadequate justification for coercive interference with the pregnant woman's right to choose an abortion, whether or not
such a procedure is medically indicated. We have already held, therefore, that
the interest balancing involved in Roe v. Wade is not controlling in resolving the
present constitutional issue.
448 U.S. at 329 (White, J., concurring).
188. Comm. to Defend Reproductive Rights v. Myers, 29 Cal. 3d 252, 625 P.2d 779,
172 Cal. Rptr. 866 (1981).
189. Moe v. Secretary of Admin. & Fin., 382 Mass. 629, 417 N.E.2d 387 (1981).
190. Right to Choose v. Byrne, 91 N.J. 287, 450 A.2d 925 (1982). In Planned
Parenthood Ass'n v. Dep't of Human Resources,
-Or.-,
687 P.2d 785 (1984),
the Oregon Supreme Court invalidated a departmental regulation restricting medicaid funding for abortion on the ground that the regulation was not authorized by
statute. The court of appeals had invalidated the rule under the equal protection
clause of the state constitution.
191. 382 Mass. at 646, 417 N.E.2d at 397.
192. Id. at 652, 417 N.E.2d at 401.
193. Id. at 659, 417 N.E.2d at 404 (footnote omitted).
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value judgment that even when the state was acting as dispenser of
benefits, it could not advance the interest in protecting potential life
over the woman's interest in exercising her right to obtain an abortion.
The New Jersey Supreme Court based its decision on the equal
protection clause of the state constitution and focused on the discrimination with respect to health. It stated: "Given the high priority accorded in this State to the rights of privacy and health, it is not
neutral to fund services medically necessary for childbirth while
refusing to fund medically necessary abortions."1'94 The court then
expressly engaged in "interest balancing," but, given its focus on
health, it struck the balance in favor of the individual interest as to
therapeutic abortions, but in favor of the asserted governmental
interest as to non-therapeutic abortions. Thus, as a matter of equal
protection under the state constitution, the state was required to
fund therapeutic abortions,
but was not required to fund non19 5
therapeutic abortions.
The California Supreme Court's decision that the state was required under the state constitution to provide medicaid funding for
all abortions at first glance appears less responsive to United States
Supreme Court decisions. The California Supreme Court has been
more of an "activist" than any other state court in relying on the
state constitution to provide constitutional protection for individual
rights beyond that which the Supreme Court has found to inhere in
the federal Constitution.1 9 6 In this case, California drew on its prior

194. Byrne, 91 N.J. at 307, 450 A.2d at 935.
195. The court stated as follows:
This balancing test is particularly appropriate when, as here, the statutory
classification indirectly infringes on a fundamental right. In balancing the protection of a woman's health and her fundamental right to privacy against the
asserted state interest in protecting potential life, we conclude that the governmental interference is unreasonable. Elective, non-therapeutic abortions,
however, do not involve the life or health of the mother, and the State may
pursue its interest in potential life by excluding those abortions from the Medicaid program.
Id. at 310, 450 A.2d at 936-37 (citations and footnote omitted).
196. It may be noted in this regard that in 1972, the California Constitution was
amended to provide expressly that, "the rights guaranteed by this Constitution are
not dependent on those guaranteed by the United States Constitution." CALIF. CONST.
art. I, § 24. However, the California Supreme Court has emphasized that this provision was a "mere affirmance of existing law." People v. Brisendine, 13 Cal. 3d 528,
551, 531 P.2d 1099, 1114, 119 Cal. Rptr. 315, 330 (1975).
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decisions involving discrimination in the allocation of governmental
benefits. Those decisions, said the court, had established a threepart standard "for judicial analysis of restrictions, like those here at
issue, which exclude from governmental benefit programs potential
recipients solely on the basis of their exercise of constitutional
rights., 19 7 Under this standard, the state had the burden of establishing that: (1) the condition relates to the purpose of the
legislation which confers the benefit, (2) the utility of imposing the
condition must manifestly outweigh any resulting impairment of
constitutional rights, and (3) there were no less drastic means by
which the purpose could be advanced. 19 8 In applying this standard,
the court put "particular emphasis upon the second prong of the test
in which it must weigh the utility of the funding restrictions against
the resulting impairment to the woman's right of procreative
choice."1 9 9 In this regard, the court noted that the right to privacy
was specifically guaranteed by the California Constitution, and that
the denial of medicaid funding would have the practical effect of
impairing the woman's exercise of her right to have an abortion. It
then balanced the woman's right to reproductive freedom against
the state's interest in protecting potential human life, and "conclude[d] that the alleged 'benefits' which flow from [the ban on
medicaid funding for abortion] in no sense 'manifestly outweigh' the
resulting impairment of constitutional rights., 200 While the California Supreme Court followed an analysis that was derived from its
prior decisions interpreting the state constitution, it too ended up by
balancing, within the framework of that analysis, the pregnant
woman's interest in exercising her right to obtain an abortion
against the state's interest in protecting potential human life.
In essence, these state courts have made a different value judgment than the United States Supreme Court has made in regard to
the constitutional permissibility of the denial of medicaid funding
for abortion. The Supreme Court has made the value judgment that,
as far as the federal Constitution is concerned, the state, when acting as dispenser of benefits, can advance the interest in protecting
potential human life over the woman's interest in exercising her

197. Comm. to Defend Reproductive Rights v. Myers, 29 Cal. 3d 252, 265, 625 P.2d
779, 786, 172 Cal. Rptr. 866, 873 (1981).
198. Id. at 265-66, 625 P.2d at 786, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 873.
199. Id. at 270, 625 P.2d at 789, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 876.
200. Id. at 282, 625 P.2d at 797, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 884.

TOLEDO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 16

right to obtain an abortion. 20 1 Massachusetts 2 ° 2 and California 20 3
have made the opposite value judgment under the state constitution, and New Jersey 20 4 has taken a middle ground, holding that the
state may refuse to fund non-therapeutic abortions, but constitutionally is required to fund therapeutic ones. Again, as in the
matter of equality of school financing, some state courts have made
value judgments that have differed from that made by the United
States Supreme Court. As a result, in these states, the ban on medicaid funding for abortions is violative of the state constitution, and
the state constitution has been construed to provide greater protection for the exercise of the right to obtain an abortion than is provided by the federal Constitution.
IV.

CONCLUSION

It has been the thesis of this article that the function of the state
constitution is to supplement the protection to individual rights
afforded by the federal Constitution and to provide additional protection against state governmental action beyond that which the
United States Supreme Court has found to inhere in the federal
Constitution. It is further contended that this function is very significant in the United States today. While there is a finite quantum
of constitutional protection that may be afforded to individual
rights, and while the federal Constitution has already been interpreted as extending a substantial amount of protection to individual rights, there is still a gap in protection that the state
constitutions may fill. This gap is substantial, and state courts have
the opportunity to expand considerably the scope of constitutional
protection to individual rights.
This article also explored the operation in practice of the state
constitution as a supplemental source of constitutional protection of
individual rights in some of the major areas of constitutional litigation. This analysis has revealed that state constitutional law is reactive to federal constitutional law in the sense that in most cases
involving constitutional challenges under the state constitution, the
real issue is whether the state court will reach a different result

201. See supra notes 180-87 and accompanying text.
202. See supra notes 181-93 and accompanying text.
203. See supra notes 196-200 and accompanying text.
204. See supra notes 194-95 and accompanying text.
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under the state constitution than the United States Supreme Court
has reached under the federal Constitution. With respect to the
constitutional protection of individual rights, the process of constitutional interpretation by the state courts is the same as the
process of constitutional interpretation by the United States Supreme Court. The result in the state courts, as in the Supreme
Court, frequently depends on a value judgment concerning the relative importance of conflicting individual and governmental interests, or as to whether a particular kind of governmental action,
such as economic and social regulation, will be subject to substantial
judicial scrutiny.
Finally, this analysis has revealed a "mixed picture" among the
state courts. In a number of states, it would not appear that the state
constitution has been interpreted as providing much or any more
protection to individual rights than is provided under the federal
Constitution. However, some state courts have been very active in
utilizing the state constitution to provide greater protection to individual rights, and some state courts have done so in some areas,
although not in others. In the aggregate, there are a large number of
state court decisions that have interpreted the state constitution as
providing greater protection for individual rights than is provided
by the federal Constitution.
The state constitution thus has great potential as a supplemental
source of constitutional protection of individual rights. It remains to
be seen whether that potential will be realized.

